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In 2001, the World Trade Organization launched a highly ambitious program of multilateral liberalization. Eight 
years later, concluding the negotiations is uncertain, though an opportunity still exists. Since 2001, many 
proposals on market access have been brought to the negotiating table by the E.U., the United States, and the G-
20. Because it is politically and economically acceptable to many parties, the final December 2008 package 
could be the basis of an agreement. An evaluation of these various proposals shows how trade negotiations have 
been following countries’ strategic interests. In eight years, the ambition of the formula to reduce agricultural 
market access tariffs has increased, but flexibilities added to accommodate domestic political constraints have 
offset delivered market access. The December 2008 package would reduce these average tariffs by 25 percent, a 
reduction very close to the one implied by the Harbinson and Girard proposals of 2003. This has to be compared 
with the 73 percent reduction in world agricultural protection by the very ambitious 2005 U.S. proposal. The 
2005 G-20 and E.U. proposals were intermediate outcomes. The December 2008 package implies a reduction of 
agricultural protection by 6 percentage points in high-income countries and 0.5 percentage points in middle-
income countries. If the U.S. proposal had been applied, these figures would have been 12.4 and 4.7, 
respectively. Different scenarios imply losses for developing countries, reflecting eroding preferences and rising 
terms of trade for imported commodities, including food products. We study how this trade reform can be more 
development-friendly. 
Keywords:  trade negotiations, computable general equilibrium modeling, developing countries 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
We commit ourselves to comprehensive negotiations aimed at: substantial improvements in market 
access; reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies; and substantial reductions 
in trade-distorting domestic support. We agree that special and differential treatment for developing 
countries shall be an integral part of all elements of the negotiations.… 
—Declaration from the World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, 
November 14, 2001 
When this declaration was adopted eight years ago, there seemed to be a great deal of enthusiasm 
about this highly ambitious program. Today the mood has changed, and while concluding the negotiations 
may still be an achievable goal, it is clouded with uncertainty. 
The Doha Round of World Trade Organization (WTO) trade negotiations was launched in a 
special political context. After the events of September 11, 2001, the international community felt the 
need for multilateral cooperation. Policymakers saw a world of free trade as the solution to poverty and, 
by extension, terrorism. Then-U.S. president George W. Bush said, “By expanding trade, we spread hope 
and opportunity to the corners of the world, and we strike a blow against the terrorists who feed on anger 
and resentment.” Benjamin Mkapa, then president of Tanzania, said, “It is futile, if not foolhardy, to think 
there is no link between poverty and terrorism.” 
The establishment of a development round in Doha (known as the Doha Development Agenda, or 
DDA) seemed to be the right political response following the failure of international cooperation during 
the 1999 Seattle WTO Ministerial Conference, where developing countries felt their priorities were not 
being taken into account by multilateral trade negotiations. However, the eight years of negotiations that 
have followed the establishment of the DDA have seen both failures and successes. Although the Cancun 
Ministerial Conference in September 2003 was characterized by North–South disagreements that split the 
negotiators and resulted in developing countries’ rejecting a proposal co-drafted by the E.U. and the 
United States, the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in December 2005 brought some progress,
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From the outset, the negotiations have been complicated. Cutting a deal among 143 countries 
(153 today) is a rather difficult task, since the world trading system is based on the combination of 
multilateral regimes with numerous regional agreements and preferential schemes, the latter being eroded 
by any WTO deal. In addition, trade distortions are concentrated in the agricultural sector; for a long time, 
a handful of high-income countries has resisted international pressure to liberalize this sector, which 
would benefit net food-exporting countries.
 such as 
the phasing out of export subsidies and the duty-free, quota-free market access regime provided by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to developing countries. During a 
“mini-ministerial meeting" organized in Geneva in July 2008, the negotiations failed, in part due to a 
dispute between the United States and India on safeguard mechanisms in agriculture. Despite this failure, 
however, WTO Director General Pascal Lamy said, “Looking at what is on the table now, members 
believe that the Doha Round is still worth fighting for.”  
2
Beyond this, world trade and the world economy have changed profoundly since 2001. WTO 
members such as Brazil, India, and the recently integrated China have emerged as major trading and 
economic powers. Their share in world merchandise exports jumped from 4.1 percent in 1993 to 7.7 
percent in 2003 and to 11.5 percent in 2008, according to the WTO website. They are members of the 
G-20 coalition, together with South Africa, which has become a major player in the WTO negotiations. 
Thus, the negotiations are no longer the reserved domain of the E.U. and the United States. In addition, 
  
                                                       
1 The Hong Kong Ministerial Conference built upon the July 2004 package, which stimulated the negotiations after the 
Cancun failure. 
2 As shown by Boumellassa, Laborde, and Mitaritonna (2009), developed countries are not more protectionist in agriculture 
than other countries in absolute level. However, they have maintained protection nearly exclusively in agriculture. The high level 
of protection of this sector explains why new commitment to agricultural liberalization by both developed and developing 
countries is still a highly sensitive issue.  
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the recent financial and economic crisis has affected economic growth worldwide and especially in 
developing countries, which have been facing declining demand for their exports, decreasing financial 
flows, and diminishing remittances. The crisis has also raised the fear of renewed protectionism and has 
highlighted the need to have a secure and stable trading environment.  
The long-term volatility of world agricultural prices has also increased since 2001, so that the 
international community is now much more concerned with potential imbalances of world agricultural 
markets. Finally, environmental issues are receiving higher priority. In particular, food supply-and-
demand issues resulting from climate change can make international trade a necessity. 
All these issues have raised expectations for international cooperation. However, the WTO is 
concerned with international trade; it does not have a mandate regarding development or the environment. 
It operates on several key principles, which have remained unchanged despite the changing trade and 
economic environment:  
1.  Global agreement: WTO negotiations are based on a take-it-or-leave-it principle, whereby 
members must agree to the entire agreement, rather than parts of it. 
2.  Unanimity: The agreement must be accepted by all WTO members, which means it must be 
flexible. 
3.  Harmonization of trade distortions: The bigger the trade distortions, the more they have to be 
cut—especially tariffs and domestic subsidies; this principle is applied via a tiered formula in 
agriculture and a Swiss formula in industry.
3
4.  Special and differential treatment: The WTO fully recognizes the economic heterogeneity of 
its members; it requires no commitment from developing countries and less commitment from 
middle-income countries. For these countries, this means smaller cuts to tariffs and subsidies 
and longer implementation periods.  
  
Since 2001, many proposals have been brought to the negotiating table. In 2003, two proposals—
the Harbinson and Girard proposals—were submitted to WTO members. The Harbinson proposal focused 
on agriculture and included a tiered formula that was supposed to reflect a potential consensus. The 
Girard proposal, on the other hand, focused on industry and included a “modified Swiss formula,” under 
which tariffs were harmonized with a corrective parameter depending on the initial average (this formula 
was particularly favored by India, which had especially high tariffs at that time). 
Just before the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in December 2005, the main negotiating 
parties submitted their own proposals, which had different versions of the tiered formula in agriculture 
concerning import tariffs and domestic subsidies and of the Swiss formula in industry with special and 
differential treatment. The United States made the most aggressive proposal. The G-20
4
In eight years of negotiation, the various positions have evolved and converged, as represented by 
the December 2008 chairs’ proposals. Market-access modalities have reached a high level of 
sophistication. The general philosophy is simple, with progressive tariff-cut formulas for both agricultural 
and nonagricultural goods. Much flexibility has been introduced, however, with different degrees of 
special and differential treatment and special provisions for tariff escalation, tropical products, and long-
standing preferences. Under the chairs’ proposals, OECD countries are to provide a duty-free, quota-free 
 proposal included 
an ambitious liberalization program for developed countries and a more limited one for developing 
countries. The E.U. proposal included a more protectionist approach for developed countries while 
preserving the main objectives of the Harbinson proposal.  
                                                       
3 The tiered formula means that tariffs are cut through a reduction coefficient that depends on their level in a certain interval: 
tariffs from x percent to y percent will be reduced by z percent. The Swiss formula means that tariff t0 will be reduced to t1 with 
, 
where a > 0. This formula implies that the higher the tariff, the bigger the cut. The reduction is more pronounced when a is small, 
since the formula ensures that t1 < a. Let us note that the Uruguay Round used different principles in some areas, for instance, 
average cuts for agriculture and target cuts in manufacturing sectors.  
4 The G-20 comprises 20 emerging and developing countries. It is led by Brazil and India and also includes China and South 
Africa. It generally plays an active role in favor of agricultural liberalization.  
3 
market access initiative for developing countries, with a three-percent exemption clause in terms of products. 
Export subsidies are to be phased out by 2013 for developed countries. Regarding domestic support, this 
package includes a harmonizing cut on overall trade-distorting support as well as sectoral disciplines.  
This paper examines how positions have evolved from the beginning of the negotiations until 
December 2008 and converged to form a package that could be agreed upon soon. It is especially 
important to compare the December 2008 package with various proposals that were put on the table 
originally either by diplomats Harbinson and Girard or by the E.U., the G-20, and the United States. Such 
a comparison shows in what direction the negotiations have gone and especially whether they have 
evolved toward a specific proposal that was originally put forward years ago. It also evaluates the initial 
degree of ambition of these stakeholders. We focus on the impact both at the world level and on the 
developing countries, since development was the initial goal of negotiators. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the methodologies employed in this 
study. Section 3 evaluates the consequences of various scenarios in terms of protection applied and faced 
and in terms of trade and welfare. Section 4 evaluates the consequences of a potential deal on developing 
countries. Section 5 concludes. 
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2.  A METHODOLOGY FOR EVALUATING THE SCENARIOS 
These assessments are based on the use of the computable general equilibrium (CGE) MIRAGE model of 
the world economy and the MAcMap-HS6 database on market access. This section provides a quick 
overview of these analytical instruments, together with the design of the scenarios that are studied in the 
following sections. 
Modeling Tools: The MIRAGE Model and the MAcMap-HS6 Database 
The MIRAGE model is a multinational, multi-sector CGE model (Bchir et al. 2002; Decreux and Valin 
2007). In this section, the MIRAGE model is used under its dynamic version, with a perfect competition 
hypothesis and without modeling direct foreign investment. We use perfect competition instead of 
imperfect competition because calibration of the latter framework necessitates supplementary data that are 
difficult to gather for many regions (number of firms, markup, and magnitude of scale economies). Based 
on standard and robust assumptions, the model may underestimate the positive effects of trade reform, 
particularly when such reform drives new investments, technology improvements, or important trade or 
production diversification. Baseline and simulations are run until 2025. The model we use differs from 
the standard version of MIRAGE in two ways:  
1.   Specific tariffs are modeled explicitly, not using their ad valorem equivalent. Therefore, even 
with constant specific tariffs, the evolution of export prices (production costs, transportation 
costs, and real exchange rate variations) leads to endogenous changes in protection level. 
2.   The overall trade-distorting support (OTDS) is explicitly modeled as a value constraint, not as 
an ad valorem equivalent, to take into account the dynamic role of the constraint (Bouet and 
Laborde 2009a, Appendix B). However, no monetary inflation is included. All values are 
expressed in 2004 US$. 
The first source of data is GTAP 7 (Narayanan and Walmsley 2008), which provides world 
macroeconomic accounts and trade flows for the year 2004. The market access data comes from the 
MAcMap-HS6 version 2.1 database (Boumelassa, Laborde, and Mitaritonna 2009), which measures 
protection in 2004 and covers nearly all regional agreements and trade preferences existing to that date. 
This database includes information on multilateral and bilateral applied tariffs and bound tariffs and at the 
six-digit. These tools have been widely used in numerous global or regional trade agreement assessments. 
Specific modifications have been made for this study: 
1.  The tariff dataset has been updated so that the baseline reflects important trade policy 
changes. Since MAcMap-HS6 was last updated in 2004, we needed to update the database to 
reflect relevant trade policy changes occurring since then, including expanded duty-free 
access to Japan for developing countries. 
2.  The phasing out of the implementation period for rice, sugar, and bananas under the E.U.’s 
“everything but arms” (EBA) initiative is taken into account. 
3.  E.U. enlargement to Romania and Bulgaria is also taken into account. 
4.  WTO accession of recent members (such as Vietnam and Ukraine) is included. 
5.  Dispute settlement consequences, such as E.U. tariffs on poultry, are accounted for. 
The GTAP 7 trade matrix is designed to discriminate between "real" trade and “virtual” trade. 
This distinction is particularly important for developing countries since their limited economic size makes 
the results for these countries sensitive to potential mistakes, in particular in the case of potential exports 
that are blocked by prohibitive tariffs in importing countries. As a consequence, the trade matrix of the 
GTAP 7 database allows for the possibility of trade creation by using constructed trade values instead of 
zeroes. For example, it includes virtual merchandise trade flows related to travel expenditures; rather than  
5 
being treated as an export of services, the expenses of, for instance, a Japanese tourist in Cambodia are 
treated as a dutiable export of the consumed goods from Cambodia to Japan.  
But these “virtual” trade flows can be problematic in our assessment when they create 
nonnegligible exports from a developing country to an OECD country after removal of a high tariff on a 
specific commodity. For instance, the GTAP 7 database displays an export of processed rice worth about 
$100,000 by Senegal to Japan facing a 340 percent tariff. Based on the model parameters (Armington 
elasticities for imperfect substitutes), the elimination of the duty can lead to a fifteenfold increase in 
Senegalese exports of rice to Japan. Unfortunately, this flow is purely artificial; there is no way of 
knowing whether trade liberalization would really boost Senegalese exports or by how much. Due to the 
magnitude of the shock, this problem would create a significant bias in our results. To address this 
problem, we split the GTAP 7 trade matrix into two categories: real trade flows, based on the trade data 
inputs to the GTAP 7 database by Mark Gehlhar
5
In addition, we have assessed the quality of the input–output tables for key products in the 
developing countries under study in order to avoid significant mistakes due to data quality problems. For 
instance, the GTAP 7 database shows that 15 percent of the production cost of processed rice in Senegal 
is due to imported wheat and 0 percent is due to the local paddy rice. This mistake in the construction of 
the input–output table may also lead to serious limitations in the CGE assessment since it implies that 
Senegal can export rice without producing it, simply by importing wheat. We fix such issues by 
reallocating the intermediate consumption to the appropriate sector in the input–output table.  
, and virtual ones. We allow tariffs and their elimination 
to affect only the former category.  
Geographic decomposition is a key element of the methodological design of the study. On the 
basis of the GTAP 7 database, we selected 29 countries or regions that have specific trade objectives or 
hold specific positions in the negotiations. Table 1 presents the geographic decomposition. The countries 
that prominently influence the negotiations are Argentina, Brazil, China, the E.U., India, and the United 
States, and, to a lesser extent the Australia-New Zealand region, Japan, and South Africa. Middle-income 
countries are represented by Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Turkey. Asian developing 
countries are represented by the Cambodia-Bangladesh region in Asia.  African developing countries are 
represented by selected Sub-Saharan African developing countries (Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia), the “Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa” zone, and the “Rest of 
Southern Africa” zone. Mexico and Canada are middle- or high-income countries that can be hurt by 
erosion of preferences in their access to the United States. 
   
                                                       
5 See the description of the database at https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/databases/trade_data.asp.  
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Table 1. Geographical disaggregation and correspondence with GTAP 7 regions 
#  Country or region  Code  GTAP 7 correspondence 
1  Australia, New Zealand  anz  AUS, NZL 
2  Rest of Oceania and of Southeast 
and East Asia—nec  xea  IDN, LAO, MMR, MYS, PHL, VNM, XEA, XOC, XSE 
3  China  chn  CHN, SGP 
4  Hong Kong  hyc  HKG 
5  Japan  jpn  JPN 
6  Korea, Taiwan  hya  KOR, TWN 
7  Cambodia, Bangladesh  lda  BGD, KHM  
8  Thailand  tha  THA 
9  India  ind  IND 
10  Pakistan  pak  PAK 
11  Sri Lanka  lka  LKA 
12  Rest of South Asia—nec  xsa  XSA 
13  Canada  can  CAN 
14  United States  usa  USA 
15  Mexico  mex  MEX 
16  Argentina  arg  ARG 
17  Rest of Latin America—nec  rlc  BOL, CHL, COL, CRI, ECU, GTM, NIC, PAN, PER, PRY, URY, 
VEN, XCA, XCB, XSM 
18  Brazil  bra  BRA 
19  E.U.  e27 
AUT, BEL, BGR, CYP, CZE, DEU, DNK, ESP, EST, FIN, FRA, 
GBR, GRC, HUN, IRL, ITA, LTU, LUX, LVA, MLT, NLD, POL, 
PRT, ROU, SVK, SVN, SWE 
20  Rest of Europe—nec  xer  CHE, NOR, XEF, XER 
21  Rest of Central and Eastern Europe 
and of Former Soviet Union—nec 
xec  ALB, ARM, AZE, BLR, GEO, HRV, KAZ, KGZ, UKR, XEE, XSU 
22  Russia  rus  RUS 
23  Middle East and North Africa  mna  EGY, IRN, MAR, TUN, XNF, XWS 
24  Turkey  tur  TUR 
25  Nigeria  nga  NGA 
26  Selected Sub-Saharan African DCs  sld  MDG, MOZ, MWI, SEN, TZA, UGA, ZMB 
27  Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa—nec  xss  ETH, XCF, XEC, XWF 
28  Rest of Southern Africa—nec  xsd  BWA, MUS, XAC, XSC, ZWE 
29  South Africa  zaf  ZAF 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on data from the GTAP 7 database. 
Note:  “Not elsewhere classified” denoted by nec; “developing country” denoted by DC. 
The sector decomposition focuses on agriculture and identifies 34 sectors, 15 of which are 
agricultural (Table 2). The reason for this distinction is that agriculture is the sector where distortions are 
concentrated. Protectionism is especially high in sectors like rice, sugar, animals and animal products, 
meat and meat products, dairy products, and beverages and tobacco products. Textiles, apparel, and 
leather products used to be highly taxed and, along with agriculture, are sectors in which developing 
countries have substantial economic interests.  
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Table 2. Sectoral disaggregation and correspondence with GTAP 7 sectors 
#  Sector  Abbrev. 
GTAP 7 
correspondence 
1  Rice  ric  pdr, pcr 
2  Wheat  wht  wht 
3  Cereal grains—nec  gro  gro 
4  Vegetables, fruit, nuts  v_f  v_f 
5  Oilseeds  osd  osd 
6  Sugar  sug  c_b, sgr 
7  Plant-based fibers  pfb  pfb 
8  Crops—nec  ocr  ocr 
9  Animals and animal products  lvs  ctl, oap, lvs, rmk, wol 
10  Forestry  onr  frs 
11  Fishing  fish  fsh 
12  Coal, oil, gas, petroleum, and coal products  ffl  coa, oil, gas 
13  Minerals—nec  onr  omn 
14  Meat and meat products  pmt  cmt, omt 
15  Vegetable oils and fats  vol  vol 
16  Dairy products  mil  mil 
17  Food products—nec  ofd  ofd 
18  Beverages and tobacco products  ofd  b_t 
19  Textiles  tex  tex 
20  Apparel  wap  wap 
21  Leather products  lea  lea 
22  Wood products  mat  lum 
23  Paper products and publishing  mat  ppp 
24  Chemical, rubber, and plastic products  crp  crp 
25  Mineral products—nec  mat  nmm 
26  Ferrous metals, metal—nec, and metal products  metals  i_s, nfm, fmp 
27  Motor vehicles and parts  mvh  mvh 
28  Transport and electronic equipment—nec, machinery and equipment —nec  cgd  otn, ele, ome 
29  Manufactures—nec  omf  omf 
30  Electricity, gas manufacture and distribution, water  svc  ely, gdt, wtr 
31  Construction  cns  cns 
32 
Trade, financial, business, and recreation services—nec, insurance, other 
services  privser 
trd, cmn, ofi, isr, obs, 
ros 
33  Transport—nec, sea and air transport  trans  otp, wtp, atp 
34  Public administration, defense, health, education, dwellings  svc  osg, dwe 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on data from the GTAP 7 database. 
Note:  “Not elsewhere classified” denoted by nec. 
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Scenarios 
In order to develop an understanding of how the negotiations have evolved and to assess whether they 
have converged toward a particular position, it is important to evaluate five negotiating proposals: (1) a 
combination of the Harbinson proposal in agriculture and the Girard proposal in industry, both submitted 
in 2003 (called the Harbinson and Girard scenario), (2) the G-20 proposal submitted in 2005 at the Hong 
Kong Ministerial (called the G-20 scenario), (3) the proposal submitted by the E.U. in 2005 at the Hong 
Kong Ministerial (called the E.U. scenario), (4) the U.S. proposal at the time of the 2005 Hong Kong 
Ministerial (called the U.S. scenario), and (5) the December 2008 package (called the 2008 scenario). 
Tariff reductions are applied at the six-digit level of the Harmonized System on a country-by-
country basis using the MAcMap-HS6 version 2 database. We explicitly take into account differences 
between bound, applied most favored nation (MFN), and preferential tariffs. Ad valorem equivalents of 
specific tariffs are computed based on the WTO guidelines for the implementation of tariff cut formulas. 
All sensitive and special products are selected using the political economy criterion of Jean, Laborde, and 
Martin (2008). 
The first scenario (Harbinson and Girard) is based on 2003 proposals from the WTO chairs: the 
Harbinson proposal for agricultural market access (TN/AG/W/1) and the Girard proposal (TN/MA/W/35) 
for nonagricultural market access. The agricultural market access tariff reduction includes a tiered 
formula with three bands for developed countries and four for developing countries. Inside each band, 
flexibility is allowed. For each tariff line, negotiators can choose the cut rate under two constraints: a 
minimal cut rate specific to each band and the simple average cut over all products for each band. We use 
the Jean, Laborde, and Martin (2008) criterion to define the optimal behavior of each country inside each 
band. We also assume 10 percent special products for developing countries, for which the cut rate is 
limited to 5 percent. The nonagricultural market access proposal (which supposedly reflects the Girard 
proposal) is based on a Swiss-like formula where the “Swiss coefficient” is equal to the simple average 
base rate times a scale coefficient (equal to 1 for developed countries and 1.5 for developing countries). 
For unbound lines, the base rate is equal to the MFN rate times 2, with a minimum of 5 percent. Countries 
that have a binding coverage below 35 percent do not reduce their tariffs.  
The second scenario is the G-20 proposal. For agricultural market access, we rely on the G-20 
proposal on market access of October 2005. This includes a tiered formula (four bands for both developed 
and developing countries) with differentiated thresholds and coefficients and a capping for highest tariffs 
(100 percent for developed countries, 150 percent for developing countries). We allow for 4 percent 
sensitive products for developed countries (6 percent for developing countries) with a 30 percent 
deviation from the formula cut (45 percent deviation for developing countries). We also include 5 percent 
special products for developing countries with no cut. The nonagricultural market access component is 
based on the 2005 Argentina, Brazil, and India communication (TN/MA/W/54). It is similar to the Girard 
formula but includes a differentiated formula for bound and unbound lines. We assume the same scale 
coefficients as in the Harbinson and Girard scenario, as well as the binding markup to compute the base 
rate on unbound lines. In addition, we consider 5 percent of tariff lines (maximum 5 percent of imports) 
with no cut.  
The third scenario represents the E.U.’s contribution of October 2005. Agricultural market access 
is described by a tiered formula (four bands) similar to that of the G-20s proposal but with a lower 
reduction target for developed countries. In addition, the lower band (0–30 percent) allows flexibility by 
defining a simple average cut target and lower and upper bound tariff reductions. Here also we use the 
Jean, Laborde, and Martin (2008) criterion to define each country’s optimal behavior inside the first band. 
Eight percent sensitive products (50 percent deviation from the formula) are authorized for developed 
countries (one-third additional sensitive products are allowed for developing countries). For 
nonagricultural market access, we use a Swiss formula with coefficient 10 for developed countries and 15 
for developing countries. The base rate of unbound tariff lines is equal to the applied MFN rate plus 10 
percent. A clause of 5 percent sensitive products (maximum 5 percent of imports) with no cut is 
implemented. A 100 percent duty-free, quota-free initiative is granted by developed countries to 
developing countries.  
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The fourth scenario is the U.S. proposal. It includes stronger tariff reduction in agriculture with 
the same formula approach as the G-20 proposal (Scenario 2) and smaller tariff caps (for example, 75 
percent for developed countries). Only 1 percent sensitive products are authorized for developed countries 
(1.33 percent for developing countries). We apply the same discipline in nonagricultural market access as 
in the E.U. proposal (Scenario 3). 
Scenarios 2–4 are based on pre-Hong Kong 2005 Ministerial proposals, with elements from the 
July 2004 package incorporated when needed. 
The fifth scenario (the 2008 scenario) is based on December 2008 modalities. An extensive 
discussion of this scenario is available in Laborde, Martin, and van der Mensbrugghe (2009). The 
agricultural market access pillar (TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4) includes a tiered formula with four bands and 
differentiated coefficients for developed and developing countries. We take into account provisions for 
sensitive and special products as well as the additional cuts that deliver special access for tropical 
products and reduce tariff escalation. For the nonagricultural market access pillar (TN/MA/W/103/Rev.3), 
we apply a Swiss formula with coefficient 8 for developed countries and a menu of options including 
sensitive products combined with a Swiss formula using coefficients ranging from 20–25. We consider 
the special cases of the recently acceded members, the small and vulnerable economies, and the countries 
with low binding coverage as defined by the document TN/MA/W/103/Rev.3. A 97 percent duty-free, 
quota-free initiative is included for OECD countries, as well as for Brazil and India to some extent.  
In all cases, developing countries as well as countries with low binding coverage are free from 
any tariff reduction in nonagricultural market access. We also always implement the consequences of the 
E.U.–Turkey customs union for nonagricultural market access for countries with low binding coverage. 
All export subsidies are removed in all scenarios. 
We use a tiered formula to reduce overall trade-distorting support (OTDS) (Scenario 5) or the 
total aggregate measurement of support (Scenarios 1–4). To sum up, in Scenario 1, all countries belong to 
the same band and the reduction rate is 50 percent. For other scenarios, the E.U. is in the last band and the 
reduction rate applied to its support is 80 percent under the G-20 proposal and 2008 modalities, 70 
percent under the E.U. proposal, and 83 percent under the U.S. proposal. For the U.S. (second band), the 
cut rate is 70 percent under the G-20 proposal and 2008 modalities and 60 percent under the E.U. and 
U.S. proposals.  
Domestic support reductions are applied in a dynamic way, as already described in Bouet and 
Laborde (2009a), with an additional assumption of a 2 percent annual rate of augmentation. We introduce 
the OTDS capping in the dynamic model. Under the standard approach, domestic support is computed 
from base year level and converted in an ad valorem equivalent.
6
1.   U.S. agricultural production is directly affected by domestic support reduction (-1.5 percent in 
agricultural and agri-business production instead of +0.1 percent).  
 This approach is unrealistic because of 
the WTO constraint on overall support and because taking into account the growth of production value in 
the agricultural sector will lead to a reduction in subsidy rate to meet the new WTO commitments. 
Focusing on agricultural production and exports, we see the following:  
2.   E.U. agricultural production is nearly unaffected by subsidy reduction, thanks to the recent 
common agricultural policy (CAP) reform and the large share of green box payments in the 
overall E.U. domestic support.  
3.   On the other hand, the OTDS limits applied to U.S. farmers will benefit E.U. producers and 
exporters. Overall, E.U. production is reduced less when the Doha Development Agenda 
tariff reduction is combined with the OTDS treatment than when it is not combined with the 
OTDS treatment (-1.17 percent versus -1.27 percent).  
4.   The situation of Brazil is magnified compared to that of the E.U. In this case, Brazilian 
production increases more with the OTDS treatment (+4.03 percent to +3.78 percent).  
                                                       
6 Since the current U.S. domestic support is below new OTDS limits, it does not lead to reduction of current policies.  
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3.  A QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE NEGOTIATION 
MODALITIES ON PROTECTION, TRADE, AND WELFARE 
This section evaluates these scenarios first in terms of impact on protection applied and faced by each 
group of countries and then in terms of trade and real income. The next section will focus on the potential 
impact of these trade reforms on developing countries. 
The Impact on Applied Protection 
Table 3 shows the impact of these different proposals on protection. The latest modalities scenario 
(column labeled “2008”) would reduce world protection by 26 percent, from 4.5 percent to 3.3 percent. In 
comparison, the U.S. proposal (column labeled “U.S.”) would have cut this world average by 50 percent, 
while the E.U. proposal would have resulted in a reduction of only 37 percent.  
Table 3. Impact of five liberalization proposals on protection applied 
    Baseline  Harbinson 
and 
Girard  G-20   E.U.  U.S.  2008 
All goods  All countries  4.5  3.2  2.8  2.9  2.3  3.3 
   High-income 
countries 
3.3  1.8  1.5  2.0  1.5  2.1 
   Middle-income 
countries 
8.6  7.5  7.2  5.7  4.8  7.5 
   Developing 
countries 
12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2 
AMA  All countries  17.8  13.4  11.0  12.3  7.6  13.4 
   High-income 
countries 
17.6  11.9  8.7  10.9  5.2  11.6 
   Middle-income 
countries 
18.7  17.7  17.5  16.5  14.0  18.2 
   Developing 
countries 
13.6  13.6  13.6  13.6  13.6  13.6 
NAMA  All countries  3.6  2.4  2.2  2.2  2.2  2.6 
   High-income 
countries 
2.3  1.1  1.0  1.4  1.4  1.4 
   Middle-income 
countries 
7.7  6.6  6.3  4.8  4.8  6.6 
   Developing 
countries 
12.0  12.0  12.0  12.0  12.0  12.0 
Source:  Authors' calculations based on MAcMap-HS6 v2.1. 
Given numerous flexibilities, world agricultural protection would decrease by 25 percent (that is, 
by less than industrial protection) if the December 2008 package were to be implemented, whereas it 
would decrease by 73 percent under the U.S. proposal. Concerning agricultural market access, the latest 
modalities scenario would cut applied protection by a little more than one-third for high-income countries 
(from 17.6 percent to 11.6 percent) and by less than 3 percent for middle-income countries (from 18.7 
percent to 18.2 percent). This should boost developing country exports to developed countries.  
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Table 4 illustrates to what extent foreign market access would be improved under each scenario. 
The latest modalities (2008) scenario would improve market access for high-income countries by 25 
percent, for middle-income countries by 29 percent, and for developing countries by 37 percent. In 
agriculture, the gains would be equivalent for the three groups of countries: around 25 percent. 
Table 4. Impact of five liberalization proposals on protection faced by exports 
    Baseline  Harbinson 
and Girard  G-20   E.U.  U.S.  2008  
All goods  All countries  4.5  3.2  2.8  2.9  2.5  3.3 
   High-income 
countries 
4.7  3.3  3.0  2.9  2.6  3.5 
   Middle-income 
countries 
4.2  2.8  2.5  2.7  2.4  3.0 
   Developing countries  3.0  1.9  1.4  1.3  1.3  1.9 
AMA  All countries  17.8  13.4  11.0  12.3  7.6  13.4 
   High-income 
countries 
17.6  13.2  10.9  12.1  7.4  13.1 
   Middle-income 
countries 
18.4  13.9  11.3  13.0  7.9  14.1 
   Developing countries  9.3  8.3  7.0  6.6  6.4  7.0 
NAMA  All countries  3.6  2.4  2.2  2.2  2.2  2.6 
   High-income 
countries 
3.8  2.7  2.4  2.3  2.3  2.9 
   Middle-income 
countries 
3.1  1.9  1.8  1.9  1.9  2.1 
   Developing countries  2.2  1.2  0.8  0.7  0.7  1.3 
Source:  Authors' calculations based on MAcMap-HS6 v2.1. 
Therefore, under the Doha Development Agenda, developing countries would improve their 
access to foreign markets but would also suffer an erosion of preferences, especially in agriculture; the 
protection faced by their agricultural exports would decline by 2.3 percentage points, compared with a 4.5 
percentage point decline for high-income countries and 4.3 percentage points for middle-income countries.  
Table 5 indicates the potential impact of the various scenarios on the volume of exports and real 
income by groups of countries. We also evaluate the potential impact of a full liberalization—complete 
removal of all import duties, export subsidies, and domestic support—as a point of reference, and finally 
we evaluate the unevenness of gains across countries by reporting standard errors (in US$) of these real 
income gains.   
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Table 5. Impact of six liberalization proposals on trade and real welfare by 2025 





Girard  G-20   E.U.  U.S.  2008  
World exports of goods 
and services  $Billions   1,934  400  502  527  621  326 
  
Variation 
(%)  11.6  2.4  3  3.2  3.7  2 
World exports of 
agriculture and agrifood 
products  $Billions  409  47  92  60  152  45 
  
Variation 
(%)  49  5.6  11  7.2  18.1  5.4 
World exports of 
manufacturing goods  $Billions  1,517  350  405  465  466  276 
  
Variation 
(%)  11.6  2.7  3.1  3.6  3.6  2.1 
Real income  $Billions  384  66  134  126  190  69 
  
Variation 














(%)  -0.67  -0.32  -0.29 
-






gains  0.98  0.29  0.45  0.35  0.51  0.22 
Source:  Authors' calculations—MIRAGE model simulations. 
Note:  Dollar amounts are in US$. 
World real income would improve by a mere 0.09 percent—about $70 billion as annual gain in 
2025—under the 2008 scenario and by 0.24 percent under the U.S. scenario. Overall global exports would 
increase by 2 percent under the 2008 scenario. This reflects the modest but positive ambition of the 
current market access modalities. Interestingly, the welfare outcome would be close to the 2003 starting 
point. Although the 2008 tiered formula in agriculture is more aggressive than that of the Harbinson 
proposal, its additional flexibilities would more than compensate for the stringent coefficients (agriculture 
exports would increase by 5.4 percent compared to 5.6 percent in the Harbinson and Girard case). This 
illustrates the dilemma of the negotiations: trying to reach a high degree of ambition with a challenging 
formula but still undermining it with flexibilities to make it politically acceptable.  
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Our modeling assumptions are conservative and do not take into account some nontariff barriers, 
liberalization in services, and some dynamic aspects of trade liberalization; nevertheless, these gains are 
at least positive for the majority of countries and equal about 20 percent of the gains from total trade 
liberalization. In addition, they lay the foundation for future liberalization by reducing the existing 
binding overhang. A much more politically challenging approach based on the U.S. proposal would lead 
to gains equaling half of what would result from full trade liberalization. 
These results illustrate how far trade negotiations have evolved even while constrained by 
defensive interests. For example, in terms of applied protection, the December 2008 package would 
decrease agricultural protection in high-income countries by about as much as the Harbinson and Girard 
proposal would and even less than the E.U. proposal would. In this same domain, the U.S. proposal would 
result in a much more ambitious liberalization of world agriculture. Regarding nonagricultural market 
access, a Doha agreement defined by the 2008 modalities would result in the liberalization of the 
economies of middle-income countries by about as much as was expected under the Harbinson and Girard 
and the G-20 proposals, while the E.U. proposal would liberalize these sectors much more. Again, 
defensive interests are respected in the 2008 proposal. This selection of the smaller common denominator 
is translated into trade changes: the highest increase is avoided in nonagricultural exports (E.U. and U.S. 
proposals, about 3.6 percent) and in agricultural trade (U.S. and G-20 proposals, between 11 and 19 
percent), and smaller increases are achieved (2.1 percent for manufacturing goods and 5.4 percent for 
agriculture and the agrifood sector).  
More importantly, some scenarios imply losses for developing countries, reflecting eroded 
preferences as a result of a multilateral agreement and rising terms of trade for imported commodities, 
including food products. While these losses are significant in the case of the Harbinson and Girard, G-20, 
and U.S. proposals, they are almost nonexistent under the E.U. proposal and quite small under the 2008 
proposal. It is important to remember that the last two scenarios include a duty-free, quota-free initiative 
given by OECD countries to developing countries, while the other scenarios do not.  
Finally, by reducing the losses of the weakest economies but also limiting the gains of the main 
winners, the long negotiation process has reduced the unevenness of the gains (see the simple standard 
deviation in the last row of Table 5).
7
                                                       
7 These results are in line with our previous analysis (Bouet and Laborde 2009b).  
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4.  DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: WHAT IS ON THE TABLE? 
A successful development round will not be achieved if the interests of the most vulnerable members of 
the multilateral trading system—the developing countries—are neglected. Since they have the Doha 
Round for free—they will not deliver new liberalization on their markets—WTO-driven domestic reform 
will not lead economic gains contrary to other countries. Therefore, the gains should come from other 
sources. This section discusses what is on the table for the developing countries and how the final 
negotiations may lead to an outcome friendlier to developing countries. 
Meager Gains for Developing Countries 
Obviously, potential gains for developing countries are zero and could even be negative under our 
conservative modeling assumptions. Table 6 presents the potential impact of these five potential trade 
reforms on developing countries’ exports in 2025. Table 7 illustrates how developing countries’ real 
incomes are affected under these scenarios, also in 2025. 
Table 6. Impact of six liberalization proposals on developing countries’ exports by 2025 
Exports in value (% change)  Harbinson 
and 
Girard  G-20   E.U.  U.S.  2008  
India  0.7  1.9  6.6  9.8  1.7 
Cambodia, Bangladesh  -4.9  -4.2  -1.6  -2.2  -3.5 
Mexico  -0.1  -0.1  1.8  2.1  0.8 
Middle East and North Africa  0.3  0.8  1.0  1.3  0.6 
Nigeria  -0.1  -0.2  -0.7  -0.4  -0.1 
Pakistan  2.4  3.0  10.7  11.5  1.1 
Rest of Oceania and of Southeast and East Asia—
nec 
2.5  2.8  4.9  5.3  1.4 
Rest of Central and Eastern Europe and of Former 
Soviet Union—nec 
0.3  0.5  0.3  0.7  0.1 
Rest of Latin America—nec  0.6  1.3  2.1  3.3  0.9 
Rest of Southern Africa   0.1  2.2  0.5  2.9  0.3 
Rest of South Asia—nec  1.0  0.7  1.3  -0.5  -0.5 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  -0.5  -0.2  -0.3  -0.2  0.0 
Selected Sub-Saharan African developing 
countries 
-0.9  -1.2  -0.1  -2.0  0.2 
South Africa  2.2  3.2  4.2  4.5  1.2 
Sri Lanka  5.7  5.8  5.2  5.8  4.8 
Thailand  4.4  5.2  8.5  9.1  4.5 
Turkey  0.3  0.4  0.8  1.2  0.5 
Source:  Authors' calculations—MIRAGE model simulations. 
Note:  “Not elsewhere classified” denoted by nec. 
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Table 7. Impact of five liberalization proposals on developing countries’ real welfare by 2025 
Real income (% change) 
Harbinson 
and 
Girard  G-20   E.U.  U.S.  2008  
India  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.5  0.1 
Cambodia, Bangladesh  -0.5  -0.4  -0.1  -0.2  -0.3 
Mexico  0.0  -0.1  0.0  0.0  -0.1 
Middle East and North Africa  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.1 
Nigeria  -0.1  -0.2  -0.5  -0.4  -0.1 
Pakistan  0.2  0.5  0.7  0.7  0.2 
Rest of Oceania and of Southeast and East Asia—
nec 
0.3  0.4  0.4  0.6  0.2 
Rest of Central and Eastern Europe and of Former 
Soviet Union—nec 
0.1  0.2  0.1  0.3  0.1 
Rest of Latin America—nec  0.2  0.3  0.1  0.4  0.2 
Rest of Southern Africa   0.2  1.2  0.5  1.6  0.2 
Rest of South Asia—nec  -0.2  -0.3  0.0  -0.2  0.0 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  -0.1  0.0  -0.1  0.0  0.1 
Selected Sub-Saharan African developing countries  -0.1  -0.1  0.2  -0.3  0.2 
South Africa  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1 
Sri Lanka  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.4 
Thailand  1.1  1.8  1.2  1.9  0.9 
Turkey  -0.1  -0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0 
Source:  Authors' calculations—MIRAGE model simulations. 
Note:  “Not elsewhere classified” denoted by nec 
In terms of the potential impact of these trade reforms on exports, unlike some middle-income 
countries, such as Sri Lanka and Thailand, that can substantially benefit from new access to foreign 
markets, developing countries, such as those in Africa, do not increase their exports substantially. In fact, 
their exports may even be negatively affected: in 2025 the exports of Cambodia and Bangladesh will be 
3.5 percent lower if the 2008 modalities are implemented. And it could be worse, since all other scenarios 
imply a decrease in exports for developing countries by 2025. Obviously, the inclusion of a duty-free, 
quota-free clause for developing countries in their exports to OECD countries (also implemented in the 
E.U. scenario) can be a compensation for their eroded preferences. Table 7 gives the results on real 
income for the same group of countries and confirms that the potential gains for developing countries are 
meager, if not negative.  
As a result, more is needed to address developing countries’ concerns. Even if we consider that 
this modeling exercise underestimates the impact of the Doha agreement on developing countries, 
potential gains are small.  
Duty-free, quota-free market access given by OECD countries to developing countries could 
boost the benefits from trade liberalization for the poorest WTO members. But this access needs to be 
redesigned with no product exemption and needs to include a larger number of granting countries, in 
particular dynamic emerging economies: Brazil, China, and India. It is also worthwhile to consider that 
small and vulnerable countries may receive this new preference as a compensation for traditional 
preferences eroded by the potential agreement.   
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In a recent paper, Bouet and Laborde (2010) examined the potential benefits and costs of 
providing duty-free, quota-free market access to the developing countries and the effects of extending 
eligibility to other small and poor countries. This analysis confirmed the result from previous research 
(Berisha et al. 2008) that 97 percent market access provides very few benefits for developing countries. 
But the evidence does not support two of the chief concerns about expanded preferential access for those 
countries. First, Sub-Saharan Africa overall stands to gain, not lose, if OECD countries, including the 
United States, provide 100 percent duty-free, quota-free market access for all developing countries; other 
developing countries, such as Pakistan, do not suffer from preference erosion. Second, preference-giving 
countries do not suffer market disruption from removing exclusions for sensitive products, such as sugar 
and dairy. Consequently, the reform seems politically acceptable. The adjustments are greater, however, if 
duty-free, quota-free market access is extended to a broader group of small and poor countries. 
Aid for trade is also a major component of the agreement. Some observers describe this initiative 
as financial compensation for countries that are expected to suffer losses under the agreement (Bouet and 
Laborde 2009b). How negative outcomes for developing countries could be further addressed by aid for 
trade is a key topic and could be the subject of a specific evaluation (Stiglitz and Charlton 2006) because 
it represents further assistance for developing countries "to increase their capacity to take advantage of 
more open markets” (WTO 2010)
8
Bouet, Mishra, and Roy (2008) used a gravity equation to investigate whether Africa trades less 
than it should as expected from gross domestic products, geographic distance, and other factors proven to 
affect trade significantly. Their results indicate that, globally speaking, Africa is an underexporter. They 
also found, however, that accounting for transport and communication infrastructure reduced the 
undertrading effect for Africa, and in some specifications of their model the undertrading effect vanished 
altogether. Results from a semiparametric model provided evidence of nonlinear impacts from 
infrastructure and of complementarities across transport and communication infrastructure, implying that 
impact is likely greater if the infrastructure is developed jointly rather than in isolation. 
 by investing in trade-related infrastructure such as transportation and 
telecommunication, which have been proven to benefit export performance.  
In other words, the Doha agreement, based on the most recent modalities package (2008), has an 
ambivalent impact on developing countries and does not offer enough to the poorest countries. It needs to 
offer more in terms of market access and reduced trade costs. But international cooperation also needs to 
be extended to other challenging areas for developing countries. 
Food Crisis Could Threaten the Gains from Trade Liberalization for Developing Countries 
Since the end of the food crisis, the role that international trade can play in food security has generated a 
great deal of debate. Food security implies availability of food products on domestic markets at an 
affordable price for local consumers. This concept strongly differs from the notion of self-sufficiency. 
Trade has always been used to compensate for a mismatch between supply and demand among countries. 
It helps increase local supply in food-exporting countries, reduce the domestic price for importing 
countries, and reduce volatility, especially in the case of asymmetric supply shocks. 
Multilateral agricultural liberalization leads to an increase in world agricultural prices due to 
increased demand driven by tariff reductions and to supply reductions in some countries (resulting from a 
constraint on subsidies). It has contrasting effects on developing countries. Agricultural exporters benefit 
directly from this trend. For net food importers, the terms-of-trade cost may be significant, and if no 
unilateral tariff reduction is implemented, domestic prices may go up, increasing the cost of food products 
for households. At the same time, due to less-distorted markets, increased disciplines, and the long-term 
nature of this upward agricultural price trend, farmers in developing countries may have more 
opportunities to invest and may gain in productivity. Agricultural production may expand; in this case, 
local consumers benefit from a larger, more affordable source of food. 
                                                       
8 Link to full text can be found at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/background_e.htm.  
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However, greater international cooperation is needed to eliminate national policies that can 
substantially increase world agricultural prices. For example, the role of biofuel policies in the food crisis 
has been discussed; it obviously implies more demand for agricultural commodities and has been driven 
by questionable subsidies and tax rebate policies. 
Other examples are export taxes and export restrictions that are not regulated by the WTO. They 
are attractive instruments for policymakers, especially in the case of rising international agricultural 
prices, because they imply a reduction in domestic agricultural prices, which benefits local consumers, 
and an increase in the international prices of goods that the country exports, as well as new public 
revenues. But they are typically beggar-thy-neighbor policies that contribute to further increases of world 
agricultural prices.  
Bouet and Laborde (2010) analyze of the use of export taxes and illustrate why they have been so 
popular during the recent food crisis. Using a global computable general equilibrium model to mimic the 
mechanisms that have appeared during the recent food price surge, they illustrate the costs of lack of 
cooperation and lack of binding process to regulate export restrictions in time of crisis. They conclude by 
stressing the need for international regulation, in particular since small net food-importing countries 
(especially developing countries) may be substantially hurt by these beggar-thy-neighbor policies that 
amplify the already negative impact of the food crisis. 
Therefore, the WTO has to tackle these issues by bringing under its regulatory umbrella policies 
that deeply hurt international trade and small net food-importing countries. Otherwise, importing 
countries will resort to protectionist tools (such as special products and special safeguard mechanisms) to 
avoid depending on foreign, and sometimes unreliable, suppliers for achieving food security targets.  
Economic Crisis Could Threaten the Gains from Trade Liberalization for Developing 
Countries 
The recent economic crisis has clearly illustrated how much developing countries depend on the 
economic growth of high-income countries. With falling economic activity, high-income countries’ 
imports have dropped drastically, translating into lower exports and lower economic activity for 
developing countries. This result is highly dependent on the current shape of trade flows and the fact that 
developing economies still face high barriers on developing markets that impede trade among themselves 
(known as South–South trade). 
Table 8. Share of OECD and BRIC in developing countries’ exports 
Year  Share of OECD in DCs’ exports  Share of OECD in world exports  Share of BRIC in DCs’ exports 
1989  75.1  81.91  7.8 
1990  76.1  81.89  7.5 
1991  78.4  78.69  6.0 
1992  72.8  75.85  8.6 
1993  73.4  72.24  9.2 
1994  76.9  72.66  6.4 
1995  69.2  71.92  8.5 
1996  67.9  71.41  9.6 
1997  67.8  71.01  10.8 
1998  68.8  73.00  8.4 
1999  69.2  74.20  10.9 
2000  66.2  73.02  14.7 
2001  65.0  72.36  14.4  
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Table 8. Continued
Year  Share of OECD in DCs’ exports  Share of OECD in world exports  Share of BRIC in DCs’ exports 
2002  66.2  71.81  12.2 
2003  62.1  71.15  17.5 
2004  58.3  69.64  21.4 
2005  56.8  68.71  24.2 
2006  55.9  68.02  27.0 
2007  57.3  70.78  27.8 
Source:  BACI and authors’ calculation. 
Note:  “Brazil, Russia, India, and China” denoted by BRIC; “developing country” denoted by DC. 
Table 8 provides the geographical structure of developing countries’ exports. OECD is the first 
destination of developing countries’ exports, but it is not abnormally high if we compare these figures to 
the share of OECD as destination in world exports (second column). What is striking is the increasing 
share of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) in developing countries’ exports, in particular since 
1998: it soared from 8.4 percent in 1998 to 27.8 percent in 2007. OECD and BRIC together have 
increased their share as destination for developing countries’ exports from 77.7 percent in 1995 to 85.1 
percent in 2007. All of this means that South–South trade has become less and less important. 
The Doha Development Agenda (DDA) will partially address this issue. Using our computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model, we simulate a 7 percent reduction in the gross domestic product of 
OECD countries during the period 2023–2025 with and without a DDA. Without the WTO deal, middle-
income countries will suffer a reduction in their real income of 0.2 percent, whereas with the DDA, this 
loss is cut in half. On the other hand, the loss increases slightly from 0.4 to 0.5 percent for developing 
countries. This is because the duty-free, quota-free initiative granted by OECD countries only to 
developing countries will reinforce the dependence of developing countries on OECD markets. Therefore, 
it is very important that the initiative include as many emerging economies as possible to help diversify 
the exports of developing countries. 
However, South–South trade improvements will be limited in the Doha Agreement due to 
generous flexibilities for developing countries and will not lead to a significant reorientation of 
developing countries’ exports. The right complement could be to reduce flexibilities that affect South–
South trade, expand regional agreements among developing countries, and increase investment in trade-
related infrastructure adapted to this type of trade. 
Renewed Protectionism Could Threaten the Gains from Trade Liberalization for 
Developing Countries 
The economic crisis has multiplied fears of renewed protectionism. A very positive impact of the DDA is 
that it would reinforce binding commitments, reduce existing bound duties, and consolidate the unilateral 
preferences granted to developing countries into the multilateral framework. By so doing, it would fulfill 
its international role for the public good by making the trade environment more secure and decreasing the 
costs associated with potential trade wars.  
In a recent study, Bouet and Laborde (2009a) examined this idea by comparing the application of 
bound duties based at their current levels, as they have been negotiated by the Uruguay Round, to the 
same policy based on the level of bound duties implied by the most recent DDA modalities (2008 
scenario). If the DDA is not implemented, current protection would double when countries resort to 
bound levels, whereas protection would increase by only 41 percent if the DDA were to be implemented. 
This difference is worth up to $809 billion in terms of trade volume and $184 billion in terms of real 
income (in 2025). Strikingly, these conclusions are especially true for poor countries. In terms of real income, 
if one considers that the real value of the DDA is measured by the preventive role it plays, from a global value 
of $184 billion, $128 billion (about two-thirds) represents the benefits to developing countries.  
19 
5.  CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, although the Doha Development Agenda may be considered as an agreement that is too 
constrained by defensive, protectionist interests, it still achieves significant liberalization. Indeed, by 
cutting applied tariffs by more than one-fourth on average among the 153 WTO members, it may deliver 
more relative gains in market access than did previous rounds of negotiation. This is particularly true for 
agricultural liberalization, where the binding process and the simultaneous dirty tariffication have limited 
the applied tariff reductions during the previous round. Ingco (1996) demonstrated that while there was 
significant and important reform during the Uruguay Round—in particular the conversion of nontariff 
barriers into tariffs and the binding of tariffs—liberalization of trade has probably been limited. In 
addition, some of the gains that the Doha Development Agenda could provide are indirect through the 
reduction in binding overhang.  
Therefore, concluding the Doha Round quickly will help WTO members grasp the gains within 
reach. As noted by Hoekman, Martin, and Mattoo (2009), there are other gains at stake, such as 
environmental benefits driven by disciplining the use of subsidies that encourage overfishing and by 
decreasing import duties on environmentally friendly technologies, benefits from trade facilitation or 
from aid for trade, and so on.  
We have shown that eight years of negotiations have managed to get a more even outcome 
respecting countries’ strategic interests, but have not permitted ambition to go further than that of the 
2003 proposals. Nevertheless, the gains the 2008 proposal would provide to developing countries are not 
substantial and in fact may be nil or negative. These benefits could be improved with a new effort on the 
part of both high-income and emerging countries in terms of improved market access, other transaction 
costs, or both. Such an effort would make the Doha Round a real development round. 
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